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Hampshire College
There is no document of civilization which is not at
the same time a document of barbarism.
-Walter Benjamin,
Theses on the Philosophy ofHistory
Speaking far outside the realm of political theory, Donald
Davidson once claimed that it is only upon some basic agreement
that true clisagreement can be founded (Davidson). Though they
represent clivergent strains-the continentaland the analytic-within
contemporary philosophy, the interpretations of the Age of Enlight
enment offered by Hannah Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre parallel
one another in surprising ways. Each characterizes the "Rights of
Man"proclaimedby Robespierre andJeffersonas empty, ungrounded
and insufficiently protected to found the new moral and political
order devised in Europe's 18th century revolutions. With this paral
lel as a backdrop, I will develop a brief MacIntyrean critique of
Arendt to bring her work into better focus. This critique claims
Arendt is insensitive to some of the fantastic philosophical upheav
als from Aristotle, St. Augustine and Aquinas to Kant, Diderot and
Hume that led to the Enlightenment's ultimate demise. I then pro
pose a quick Arendtian response to this cd ticism: wi th an addition of
some philosophical work, with a quantitative change, Arendt's En
lightenment work would satisfy the Maclntyrean argument I em
ploy. It then becomes clear that though Arendt can respond to this
argument through such quantitati ve changes, the Maclntyreanmight
lack such a response to the Arendtian criticisms I propose. To satisfy
Arendt, MacIntyre would be required to transform his work, to make
not simply quantitative but qualitative, even fundamental, changes in
Janiak is completing his last YCIlr ofstudy at Hlwillsitire Colli~ge. where he com:entmted ill
philosophymId TXllitics. Alldrewis currently Editoroftize Five College Journal of Law and
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After Virtue. Though MacIntyre sees the Enlightenment project's
failure as philosophical in nature, Arendt characterizes the emptiness
of rights rhetoric born from the American and French revolutions as
political in character. This Arendtian response to MacIntyre facilitates
a deeper presentation of some of the more subtle points in Arendt's
interpretation of the Enlightenment. From an Arendtian standpoint,
MacIntyre mischaracterizes the very nature of the failure embodied
in the Age of Enlightenment, the failure that she thought led to the
rise of fascism, such as the Nazism she fled and fought throughout
the early years of her life.
I. Arendt's Critique of Rights
Hunchback: "You know Marshall, Iused to be a Jew."
Marshall: "Oh really? ... I used to be a hunchback."
-Groucho Marx, Groucho at Carnegie Hall
The European revolutions of the 18th century brought the proc
lamation of a series of rights, such as the rights of man and the citizen
in France and rights endowed in every human by their Creator in
America. These were extensively explicated and critiqued by Arendt,
particularly in the book that made her famous in America, The
Origins of Totalitarianism. There, Arendt argues that though the
newly established American and French nation-states introduced
and claimed to foster human rights, historically they have protected
only citizen's or national rights, such that the "loss of national rights
in all instances entail[edl the loss of human rights," and, in turn, that
human rights could be guaranteed only through "national emanci
pation" (OT, pp. 299,291).1 As these citizenship rights were extended
to increasingly large sections of European and American popula
tions, assirnilationist-rnindedJews on the Continent gladly accepted
the barmer of civil rights, as for them it represented the best bulwark
against an ever-present European anti-semitism. By the close of the
18th century, bourgeois Jewry often exhibited a great faith, some
what naive in Arendt's view, in their respective states and a willing
ness to assimilate themselves into French or German cullure to
demonstrate their allegiance to the nations that had recently em an
1 Cf. also Benhabib, S. "Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of Narra
tive," Social Research Vol. 57 Spring 1990; pp. 167-68.
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cipated them. 2 Jews were willing to "adjustin principle to everything
and everybody," a sentiment that meant, in the Europe of the early
19th century, a willingness to accept emancipation and the newly
established civil rights as assimilated members of European nation
states (JP, p. 63).
As Arendt demonstrates in her biography, Rahel Vamlzagm, the
assimilationists, or parvenus, attempted both social and cultural
integration into the European bourgeoisie on individual bases: each
denied his or her Jewish identity and became faceless members of
civil society (RV, pp. 26, 30, 85; cf. IF, p. 85). In this way, of course,
assimilated Jews exemplified the condition of modernity: though
they suffered communally at the hands of anti-semitism-that is, it
was as Jews that they suffered-they chose to fight this oppression
individually, apolitically, as atomized individuals. 3 At first, Arendt's
Rahel first embraces this tactic of assimilation into German culture
by attempting to renounce and to deny, even in the privateness of her
diary, her Jewish identity. This attempt ultimately brings her face to
face with a paradoxical and deeply disturbing reality: Rahel realizes
that to truly assimilate into anti-semitic German or European cul
ture, she must become an anti-semite. At this prospect, Rahel recoils
and chooses instead to maintain her Jewishness in the face ofboth the
anti-semitism of German culture and the many parvenus who fre
,quent her salon (RV, pp. 216, 224). This was, in Arendt's view, an
admirable and conscious choice on Rahel's part. In contrast to
Rahel's perseverance, many Jews gave in to assimilation, but this
very assimilation, if taken to mean a complete integration into
bourgeois Christian culture, and the loss of all Jewish characteristics,
ended in failure. European Jews could not, despite their best efforts,
relinquish their Jewishness. 4 Kurt Blumenfeld called this the "objec
tive Jewish question," the inescapability of Judaism for European
Jews (Blumenfeld in Young-Bruehl, p. 72).
On a broader historical scale, Arendt's work demonstrates the
~ For the Jewish "faith" in European nation states, see Ron Feldman's introduc
tion to IP, p. 27; for Arendt's comments, see IP, pp. 63-64.
3 For Arendt's view of the atomization prevalent in modernity, see He p. 5~ff,
p.21Off·
4 Arendt writes of "the history of a hundred and fifty years of assimilatedJewry
who performed an unprecedented feat: though proving all the time their non
Jewishness, they succeeded in remaining Jews all the same" UP, p.64).
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truly dialectical dilemma of modem Jewry and its relation to the
failure of the Enlightenment to establish a moral foundation for
politics and a bulwark against recurrent bouts of anti-semitic vio
lence throughout Europe. Under modernity, Jews joined and were
swept up ina dialectical movement of great proportions: those Jews
who rejected their given pariah status opted to become the assimi
lated parvenus Rahel knew so welL The pariah Jews rejected the
parvenu tactic of assimilation into European bourgeois culture as
fervently as their assimilationist cousins defined themselves over
and against the masses of Europe 's poor Jewry, especially its Ostjuden.
Hence, an antithesis of identities and of social roles grew historically
within the Jewish community. particularly for the Jews in Germany
that remain Arendt's focus. These antithetical poles of Jewish history
and identity were synthesized under Nazism, where all Jews, re
gardless of social status, were rendered Jews per se and en masse, and
murdered as such UP, p. 90). In the concentration camp. we see the
final proof that the very pariah/parvenu distinction Jews struggled
for two centuries to maintain proved, in the last analysis, irrelevant. 5
This history forms a centerpiece of the Enlightenment and its
rights legacy as Arendt saw it, for the only rights available in Europe
were national rights. and Jews, even the parvenus, never fully emerged
as accepted na tional citizens. Here we reach the terrifying possi bility
that. if stripped of their newly -found and still tenuous civil rights. the
Jews would sit naked, rightless, vulnerable. On Arendt's view, the
Nazis understood and exploited this peculiar situation of European
Jewry, a result of the Enlightenment's limited protection of the
peoples under its tutelage. Indeed, long before the Final Solution,
Hitler's regime moved in the early 1930s to strip Jews of their civil
rights as German citizens, which they knew would remove their
"legal status" altogether, rendering Jews de facto and de jure rightless
(OT, p. 296).6 In Arendt's estimation, the anti-Jewish Nuremberg
Laws of1935 violated not human but national rights (El, p.268). These
political moves of the 30s paved the way, of course, for the rapid
expulsion, forced concentration and final extermination of Germany' s
5 As Arendt writes in Eicl111Ul1l1l in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evt7 , for
the Nazis, "aJew is aJew."
(, Cf. also £/, p. 138: "In nearly all countries, anti-Jewish action started with
stateless persons."
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and Europe's Jewish populations.7 It was always stateless Jews, and
other so-called enemies of the Reich with refugee status, who met
with their death first, for they lacked the only political protection
available in Europe at that time. indeed the only protection available
since the Enlightenment erupted (EI. p. 191 passim). It is, of course,
with great irony that Arendt notes how Adolf Eichmann could only
be tried before the Jerusalem court because he too was stateless, a
mere foreign national in Argentina, a man unclaimed and unpro
tected by the Federal Republic of Germany and left to face Israel's
judgment (E/. p. 240).
Here Arendt's critique of the Enlightenment and of the rights
rhetoric it generated becomes clear: because of the solely national
protection of rights, Jews and other refugees stripped oftheir citizen
ship "had lost those rights which had been thought of and even
defined as inalienable, namely the Rights of Man" (OT, p. 268). With
respect to the masses of new refugees roaming Europe in the 1930s
and early 1940s, Arendt demonstrates how the condition of modern
Jewry became the condition of modernity for many Europeans, how
the two were suddenly united in their stateless and rightless predica
ment (JP. p. 20. 66). Arendt emphasizes unequivocally that the
Enlightenment's failure to estabUsh and protect human rights set the
precedent for this catastrophe. The holocaust brought an end to the
cultural distinctions Jews had fostered among themselves, an end to
Jewish hope for the future promised under civil emancipation in
Europe, indeed the "end of the world" for European Jewry (El, p.
153). And perhaps most radically, it meant the end of the Age of
Enlightenment and its legacy.

II. Macintyre's Interpretation of the Enlightenment
With the publication ofAJter Virtue in 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre
emerged as a strong critic of the contemporary scene in analytic
moral philosophy, particularly of the moral precepts he thought we
have inherited from the Aristotelian project of grounding morality in
rationality and human nature. We see a close affinity between the
Enlightenment critiques of MacIntyre and Arendt: both demonstrate
7 For these three stages in the Nazi program against European Jewry. d. El.
chapters 4. 5 & 6.
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the emptiness of contemporary rights rhetoric in relation to the
Enlightenment project of extending inalienable or natural Rights to
hurnani ty. Though Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant or Jefferson
took Rights to be inextinguishable, as the foundational moments of
morality and politics, Arendt and MacIntyre both contend that such
rights do not exist inherently and that they are dependent onpolitical
communities and the social institutions that support them. 8 On a
grand scale, Arendt and MacIntyre characterize the late-20th century
as a "post" era: for MacIntyre "post-Enlightenment," for Arendt
"post-tra ditional," an era that is witness to the sinking of Europe and
the Americas into moral and intellectual chaos,9 into an age without
authority, tradition (Arendt), or the necessary grounding in coherent
views of hwnan nature (MacIntyre). Because of these parallels, I
want to construct a criticism of Arendt's analysis from within
MacIntyre's project, a critique centered on Arendt's view of the
Enlightenment, pushing that analysis into greater focus and giving
it greater clarity against the background of After Virtue. First, I will
briefly outline MacIntyre's narrative of the Enlightenment.
In After Virtue. MacIntyre delineates precisely how moral dis
course fell into its present predicament of emptily asserting rights
and moral precepts-largely inherited from Arlstotelianism and
Christianity-without properly grounding them in coherent con
ceptions of human nature and rationality. MacIntyre the Aristotelian
tra vels, not surprisingly, to fourth century B. C. Athens to unearth the
roots of our current condition. In Aristotelian ethics, phronesis, trans
latable perhaps as practical reason (or wisdom),l0 is posited as the
ability to distinguish good ends from imposters, to discern the
proper aim of action (praxis) within a moral framework. In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that intelligence [phronesis] is a
state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action
about what is good or bad for a human being (NE, p. 154~ 1140b).
g or, "The Decline of the Nation-state and the End to the Rights of Man;" J1 V,
pp, 66-7. 69, passim,
9 For Maclntyre, this chaos is exemplified, in par~ in emotivism and its moral
cousins: d. AV. chapter 1. passim.
10 Terence Irwin's translation of phronesis as "intelligence" migh~ given the
contemporary usage of this term and its correlates. be rather misleading. Irwin
recognizes the possible problems with this rendering of the term in his translation
ofthe Nicomacflearl Ethics at pp. 412-13.
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This differs significantly from the contemporary notion of ratio
nality an ability that uncovers the best route to achieve presupposed
ethical aims; for Aristotle, phronesis itself proposes these aims (AV,
pp.52-3).
Aristotle also held a teleological view of human development: to
remain healthy on the moral, intellectual and spiritual levels, one
must progress through particular stages of growth from childhood
through old age. Hence Aristotle might argue that Susan ought to,
through phronesis pick those aims that we know contribute to the
happiness of people a ther stage oflife-development. Though strenu
ous exercise may be seen as beneficial at one stage of human life, it
might not help an exhausted 80-year old to realize her telas. That is,
phronesis distinguishes moral from immoral, or improper, aims
through human teleology, through the view of human nature that
demonstrates the proper endpoint of human life and the necessary
steps we must take toward reaching our life climax. Finally, Aristotle
outlines, in Macintyre' slanguage, various "moral precepts" to guide
one toward one's true end, precepts that enable one to develop a
virtuous character to guide one in realizing one's felos (A V, pp. 52-3).
In MacIntyre's view of Aristotelian ethics, then, the three compo
nents of morality derive meaning from their interrelation; separate one
from the whole and all quickly lose their coherency and purpose (A V,
pp.54-5).
MacIntyre then demonstrates how western moral philosophy
moved from this basic Aristotelianism, through the Christianity of
Augustine and then Aquinas, into the 18th century and the Enlight
enment, resting finally in its present form within contemporary
analytic discourse and the wider Euro-American culture. ll He char
acterizes contemporary culture as having retained only the moral
precepts we inherited from the Greeks, as filtered through Christian
moral doctrine and its revisions by Enlightenment thinkers such as
Hume and Kant, as having lost the very support for those precepts:
Aristotelian teleology and phronesis (A V, pp. 54-7). This current
predicament stems, in Macintyre' sself-proclaimed "historicist" view.
from trends already evident in France in 1640, the site of the fireplace
I

l

11 For another broad, historically sensitive philosophical account of the relation
of the Enlightenment to the rise of instrumental rationality, see Horkheimer M. and
T. Adorno, Dinleefie of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum, 1991.
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at which Descartes wrote his Meditations, and at the University of
Padua, 'where Galileo fidgeted with his new telescopes and peered at
the heavens in an astonishing new way. Here, of course, we find the
birthplace of modern science. With it developed a purely instrumen
tal view ofhuman rationality, a view that replaced phronesis with the
Reason that founded science, developed the calculus of Leibniz and
N ewton, led to the founding of the American and French republics,
and brought to humanity the industrial revolution. 12 This newratio
nality presupposed as already established all human ends and
goods, and found the most efficient method of obtaining them, but
itself could find no ends (A V, p. 54-7).13 In this analysis, Macintyre
rightly po~ts to Hume, whose Treatise on Human Nature appears a
good century after this new view ofreason takes shape, as a philoso
pher who took reason to exhibit solely an instrumental function, with
science and mathematics asits obvious territory. 14Reason, for Hume,
is "the slave of the passions,"lS a mere efficient calculator of the best
Ineans to already-determined moral ends (TBN, §III, 3, 3, p. 415).
Hence, Hume famously, or perhaps infamously, writes: "'Tis not
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of my finger" (THN, §III, 3, 3, p. 416). This remained
significant within western philosophy well into the 19th century, as
Nietzsche testifies in 1886 in Beyond Good and Evil, when he claims
that "reason is only an instrument" (BGE, §191).
The death of phronesis paralleled the equally significant philo
sophicalloss of teleology. Aristotle might counsel, for instance, to eat
in moderation, for it will prove difficult to remain in the proper
physical state in old age if one eats voraciously in one's youth.
12. Interestingly, Arendt chronicles the perhaps parallel development of praxis
into modern actior!, a purely instrumental notion whereby the performance itself is
irrelevant Cf. HC, pp. 228-30.
1:1 Arendt's discussion of modern science and of the development of modern
mathcmntics via instrumental rationality parallels in many ways MacIntyre's own
presentation. C£' HC, "The Discovery of the ArchimedeanPoin~" and also p. 268ft.
11 Poul Eidclberg suggests that Hobbes can be seen as Hume's historical
predecessor in this respect. (For his view of Hobhes, he relies on the Leviathan.) He
bemoi:lns the implicationsofthe view that reason is impotent in the face of emotion
for 20th century psychology "The Malaise of Modern Psychology," The Journal of
J>HycJlOlogy Vol. 126 1992; p. 109ff.
lr, For more on Hume and his 18th century rivals and mentors among the Anglo
philosophicnl community, d. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics. New York:
Macmillan, 1966; chapter 12.
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Because we modems have lost this perspecti ve on the proper human
end-state, and even of the successive stages through which human
life ought to proceed, the mere injunction to eat in moderation lacks
coherency: it requires rational argument if it is to be followed
properly, and it is precisely this that it now must do without.
Macintyre notes, however, that we are not left utterly stranded,
that we have retained our inheritance from the Enlightenment, a bag
of rights and of Reason supporting them, but in his view this
represents a rather problematic inheritance, even a dangerous one
(AV, pp. 66-7). MacIntyre argues that we have retained the notion of
the Rights of Man developed in the 18th century, but now lack any
coherent, rational arguments demonstrating both their existence and
their necessary moral and social function in late-20th century west
ern society (AV, 66fj). Yet here is the Enlightenment paradox: it
simultaneously removed all authority, all foundation, from under
the medieval moral and political order, and attempted, in part
through the concept of "rights," to found a new social order without
any of the old philosophical foundation. As Arendt writes in "What
is Authority?":
the revolutions of the modern age appear like gigan
tic attempts to repair these foundations, to renew the
broken thread of tradition, and to restore, through
founding new political bodies, what for so many
centuries had endowed the affairs of men with som e
measure of dignity and greatness (BPF, p. 140).
Put in crude tenns, the predicament that Arendt would surely
recogruze 16 is that we lack God, the Catholic Church and Aristotelian
teleology and phronesis to ground our current moral views, to serve
as the foundation and guarantor of what have become hu man rights:
we have dismantled the foundation but somehow retained bits and
pieces of the roof. Hence, the Enlightenment failed to provide the
necessary philosophical grounding for the new order. 17 Rights are, of
16 See, e.g., her discussion in "What is Authority" of the end to the Roman
stabilizing trinity of religion, authority and tradition (BPE, p. 140).
17InOn Revolution Arendt characterizes modern revolutions assa fundamental,
so different from other "mere changes" in political life, that they constitute for her
"beginnings" of new orders (OR, p. 21).
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cuurse, protected by and developed from within legal orders, but
MacIntyre notes that they lack coherent philosophical support, and
therefore could not and cannot serve as the basis for the new moral
and political order. Equally, they cannot save us today.18
III. A Quick MacIntyrean Response to Arendt

N ow I can bring into focus a MacIntyrean criticism of Arendt's
work on rights and the Enlightenment as a rhetorical device to better
explicate that work Both philosophers begin their critiques with the
contention that human rights, since the Second World War, have
failed to ground moral and political life ,have proven unsuccessful in
protecting Vulnerable peoples, and perhaps even lack sufficient
coherency and support to bode well for the future. Once we have
seen this affinity between their work, the possibility of criticism
arises, for while MacIntyre might find much in the theoretical
sections of The Origins of Totalitarianism that he concurs with, he
might ultimately chide the historically-minded Arendt for failing to
sufficiently explicate the deeply rooted philosophical forces within
western culture that have led to the emptiness of current moral and
political rhetoric. It is precisely because Arendt would be sympa
thetic to such an account that MacIntyre's disappOintment and
subsequent critique might arise. For Macintyre, both Europe's philo
sophical and historical pasts must be understood if contemporary
philosophers are to develop the necessary tools to critique, under
mine and replace the current debates over rights with debates
centered on virtues. Arendt is by no means ignorant of the history of
philosophy, far from it; yet from MacIntyre's perspective, her his
torj~al work in (e.g.) The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in
len/salern is far too caught up in social and political details to notice
the broad philosophical picture he implores us to consider. Though
she is clearly aware of the death of phronesis and the demise of
Aristotelian teleology, she fails to provide this philosophical back
ground in her analysis of the Enlightenment's failure. This failure
was ltl.ade possible not simply by European historical events, but also
by centuries of the slow erosion of our philosophical heritage,
18 Arendt argues that the Declaration of the Rights of Man was indeed intended
to found a new political order for France, and perhaps even for Europe (OR. p. 109).
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leaving only the foam of empty rights at the brim of our collective
cup. Thus, I do not take MacIntyre-the-historicist to reject the politi
cal history Arendt provides as irrelevant, but as insufficient, requir
ing more philosophical analysis and more work in the history of
philosophy.19 For MacIntyre, a historico-philosophical understand
ing of this event will secure us, on a communal level, from contem
porary "barbarism," the very barbarism that Arendt spent her life
chronicling and fighting (AV, p. 263).
This MacIntyreanresponse to Arendt's work is, I think, suscep
tible to what one might call a quantitative solution on Arendt's part.
Precisely because the Arendt of The Human Condition is aware of the
rise of instrumental rationality, the use of reason by Descartes and
Galileo and the end to Aristotelian teleology and the Greek virtues,
she might integrate more of these philosophical elements into her
critique of the Enlightenment developed in The Origins ofTotalitari
anism and elsewhere. As Arendt provides the sort of political history
MacIntyre characterizes as important, even crucial, to an under
standing of our present predicament, her work requires philosophi
cal supplementation to satisfy MacIntyre's criticism. In fact, On
Revolution looks similar to the sort of histolico-philosophical work
MacIntyre alludes to-here Arendt recognizes the very sort of "phi
losopher-influence" on political events MacIntyre chides social his
torians for down-playing in their scholarship:
By the same token, I am inclined to think that it was
precisely the great amount of theoretical concern and
conceptual thought lavished upon the French Revo
lution by Europe's thinkers and philosophers which
conhibuted decisively to its world-wise success, de
spite its disastrous end (OR, pp. 219-20).
This MacIntyrean push on Arendt reveals that her work on the
Enlightenment could be supplemented by more extensive philo
sophical exegesis on her part.

19 For MacIntyre, of course, unless we see our p hilosophica\ ills, we will not see
a new Aristotelianism as the cure to these ills.
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IV. Arendt's Counter-Critique

Deutschland, Deutschland Uber alles was, I fear, the end
of German Philosophy.
-Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
Arendt is famous for resisting labels. Is she a Jew, existentialist,
Zionist, Nietzschean, modernist, postmodernist, political theorist,
Heideggerian, or historian?20 In response to Gershom Scholem's
question on how to place her, Arendt herselffamously wrote: "If I can
be said to 'have come from anywhere,' it is from the tradition of
German phil'o sophy" (Encounter, in Hinchman, p. 435). As might be
expected, some recent commentators, such as Dana Villa, argue that
her work has strong Heideggerian and Nietzschean elements, reject
ing, for example, the claim that she represents a mOdern-day Aristo
telian, a view apparently defended by Habermas in the past (Villa,
274ff). Jeffrey Isaac, in turn, chides Villa for ignoring Arendt's
extensive work on "anti-Semitism, imperialism, the Holocaust, the
Stalinist usurpation of revolutionary politics, the Cold War balance
of terror, the' crIses of the republic,'" work he apparently considers
far more important than the philosophical exegesis in Between Past
and future Dnd '! he Human Condition that Villa must rely heavily on
for his interpretation (Isaac, p. 535). Without attempting to settle this
question-which, in part, seems interesting only in the context of the
modern-day Arendt industry within academia-I think it fair to say
that she had significant political and historical concerns throughout
much of her mature life. I refer to this problem of placement only
because part of Macintyre's criticism above derives from my charac
terization, from what I think might be his perspective, of Arendt as
an "historicist," or at least as an historically-minded philosopher. I
will now generate an Arendtian response to MacIntyre. In doing so
2(1 For <1 discussion of Arendt and existentialism, see 1. P. Hinchman and S. K.
Hinchm<1n, "Arendt's Debt to Jaspers," ReviewofPolit.ics Vol. 531991; pp. 435-68. For
<1 discuilsion of Arendt's Zionism, see Young-Bruehl. Hmma/! Arendt. For a discus
sion of tho Nictzschean elements in Arendt's work, see "Beyond Good and Evil:
Arendt, Niulr.:sche. ,md the AestheticizationofPoliticalAction," Political TheoryVol.
201992; pp. 274fl Also, Benhabib claims that at least with respect to certain issues,
Arendt is <1 "political modernist," (p. 168).
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I will forego the rather obvious move of having her reject the
historicist label a MacIntyrean might pin on her in favor of a more
detailed, critical response concerning philosophical methodology
and, specifically, the proper mode of analysis for dealing with the
Enlightenment's failure, an event that, in part, led to the barbarism
both Arendt and MacIntyre identify as a principal component of
contemporary intellectual and moral life.
As noted, MacIntyre explicitly adopts an historicist label: he
considers philosophical arguments and developments within a broad
historical context, remaining sensitive to significant cultural diver
gence among the British, French, German, Dutch and other philoso
phers whose work he represents. For an Arendtian, this approach is
far more admirable than the ahistorical, and possibly more narrow,
exegetical work of Anglo-American analytic philosophers,
MacIntyre's colleagues. Hence the Arendtian criticism of MacIntyre
concerns neither the relevance of history for philosophy, nor the
success of the Enlightenment, but is deeper and more substantial
than these, involving the very nature ofthe failure they both see in the
18th century articulation of Rights as the guarantors of a stable moral
system, indeed as the very found a tion of politics for Europeans and
Americans. For MacIntyre, this is principally a philosophical failure,
albeit an historically grounded one. This claim becomes the crux of
my Arendtian critique of MacIntyre.
In Arend.t's view, the divorce of phHosophy from politics by
Plato, a separation upheld by nearly every western philosopher in
what she calls "the tradition," met swiftly with its demise in the mid
19th century with Marx's last thesis on Feuerbach: "The philoso
phers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is
to change it" (Marx, p. 158}.21 Though she may feeinostalgiafor what
we have lost of the philosophical legacy of Plato and Aristotle,22
Arendt does welcome a politically-minded, histOrically-specific phi
losophy, an enterprise combining masses of historical data with
11 In Arendt's view, serious difficulties and confusions have resulted from
philosophers' ignorance of the political: for e.g., considering freedom to be <l
question of the relations among the will, thought, and action, a purely philosophicol
question divorced from political realities. Cf. BPF, "What is Freedom?" p. 145ff.
22 On Arendt's nostalgia for pieces of the p hilosop hical tradition she chronicles
that now lay dead, see Villa, D.R. "Postmodernismand the Public Sphere," American
Political Science Review Vol. 86, Issue 3 1992; p. 719.
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broad philosophical insights ,integrating critiques ofindividual mem
bers of the Nazi party with long exegeses of the basic underpinnings
of Nazism. Arendt's critique of the Enlightenment must be placed
within this framework, for she considers the failure of the Judeo
Christian tradition in the 20th century to be political innature, and not
philosophical, as in MacIntyre's work. In investigating totalitarian
ism, the climax of this moral collapse, Arendt writes that "the event
illuminates its own past," for her a political past: her characters are
not principally Hume, Diderot and Kant, Aristotle, Augustine and
Aquinas, but Goring, Himmler and Eichmann, Dreyfus, Rhodes and
Lazare (Young-Bruehl, p. 203).23
It is here that I can construct Arendt's principal critique of
MacIntyre: he reads Kant but not Hirnmler, Hurne but not Rhodes, a
fact that blinds him to the fantastic political failure of the Enlighten
ment to protect, through rights, the Jews and other peoples that
became the focal point of the Nazi genocidal program. For Arendt,
MacIntyre does not venture sufficiently far from traditional philoso
phy into the tombs of modern history, into anti-semitism, imperial
ism, racism, into the volumes that chronicle the concentration camps,
where the JudeO-Christian legacy of founding morality on rights was
slowly but surely murdered. I must emphasize here "sufficiently
far," for it is precisely MacIntyre's first steps into historically-based
philosophy that open him to Arendt's criticism. It would surely be
useless. if not comedic, to criticize, say, W.V.O. Quine for ignoring
relevant political events in his .investigations into set theory or
symbolic logic. But MacIntyre takes seriously the notion of his tori
cism,24 he considers the Enlightenment's failure to be historically
specific, and would presumably criticize his colleagues for ignoring
relevant cultural differences among 18th century philosophers, for
instance, or for missing the historical development of whatis consid
ered rational support for a philosophical position. It is precisely this
2JThis is not to say, of course, that because the failure was political, philosophy
is irrl'ievant for Arendt. She claimed, in fact, that philosophy too is not entirely free
of guilt for the Holocaust: "Not of course, in the sense that Hitler somehow had
something to do with Plato. ". Butin the sense that occidental philosophy never had
a pure conceptof poli tics and could not have such a concept because it always spoke
of Man and never dealt with human plurality" (Arendt in Young-Bruehl, p. 255).
2·j See especially AV, chapter 18, where MacIntyre explicitly proclaims his
historicism.
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that makes Arendt's criticism of MacIntyre's work so powerful, for
. he largely ignores the historical movements to which he claims to be
sensitive.
I do think I can develop a MacIntyrean response to this criticism,
in part because he has been criticized along somewhat similar lines
by Abraham Edel, of whom MacIntyre writes:
The gist of his criticism is ... that I focus too much
attention upon the level of explicit theorizing, articu
lated concepts, and the stories told about their condi
tionby various peoples and not enough on the actual
social and institutional life of those peoples (A V, p.
271).
To Edel's sentiment MacIntyre first retorts that social history
must be far more sensitive to theoretical development than it appears
to be at present; his work is a step in this direction. Secondly, he
admits that Edel is in part correct in his criticism, for the narrative of
After Virtue, i.e. the story of western moral philosophy and its
apparent downfall, would certainly benefit from more "social and
institutional history," history that, MacIntyre admits, he largely
presupposes in this project (A V, pp. 271-2). Frorn MacIntyre's view,
Isuppose,he could have said far more ofHume'sScotland,Aristotle's
Athens, the founding of the American and French republics, the
industrial revolution, and pe!haps even the rise of fascism. He thinks
that more history would strengthen his narrative; hence he takes
Edel's criticism to be principally quantitative in character.
This response to Edel allows me to sharpen what I think would
be Arendt's critique ofthemethodology impli cit in After Virtue. I take
Macintyre and Arendt to agree in principle that rights rhetoric, both
that prevalent in the 18th century, and its contemporary form, to be
lacking in validity, or to be what we might call empty. For MacIntyre,
this emptiness is philosophical, owing its existence to the failure of
moral philosophers to ground rights in. human nature and human
rationality, to make rights and the moral precepts they entail and
presuppose philosophically substantial, strong enough to weather the
coming storm. Arendt rejects this notion, for she unequivocally
states that human rights never found sufficient grounding, not in
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human nature and rationality, but in politics, for the era of the 1930s,
that
period of political disintegration [that] suddenly and
unexpectedly made hundreds of thousands of hu
man beings homeless, stateless, outlawed, and un
wanted ... could only have happened because the
Rights of Man, which had never been philosophically
established but merely formulated, which had never
been politically secured but merely proclaimed, have,
in their traditional form, lost all validity (0, p. 447).
From Arendt's viewpoint, in thinking the emptiness of rights is
philosophicat, MacIntyre commits a qualitative, indeed fundamental
error, one not amenable to repair through the mere quantitative
measures he proposes in response to Edel's attack.
For an Arendtian,. After Virtue represents a deep
mischaracterization, not only of the Enlightenment project, but of
our prese:lt moral and political condition, of the post-tradition era
we now inhabit. For it is not the present emotivist culture, as
lvlacIntyr<;;! claims, that both signals and constitutes the
Enlightenment's failure: it is Auschwitz.
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